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RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS
BILLS AND NO'trs-"FicTnous PAYe"--PAYE8 A PERsoN NoT INTXNDXD
To HAvz ANY INTtRrsT.-A member of a firm, authorized to sign the firm's
name, made checks payable to an existing association, which he did not intend
should ever gain possession of or have any interest in such checks, merely
for the purpose of obtaining money for himself, which he did by unlawfully
indorsing the association's name to the checks. The plaintiff firm now seek
to recover the amount of the checks, charged to their account by the defendant bank, and the defense is that the payee was a "fictitious payee" under the
NEGOTIABIu INSTRUMENTS STATUTE, Sec. 9 (3), and hence the checks were
payable to bearer. The statute provides, "The instrument is payable to bearer
* * * when it is payable to the order of a fictitious or non-existing person
and such fact was known to the person making it so payable." Held, that
the defendant bank was not liable, since the checks were made payable to
the name of a person not having any interest in, and not intended to become
a party to, the transaction, wherefore the payee is a fictitious person under
the statute and the checks were payable to bearer. Mueller & Martin v.
Liberty Ins. Bank (Ky., I92O), 218 S. W. 465.
This case adds another jurisdiction to those of New York, Illinois, and
Pennsylvania, which hold that the words "fictitious and non-existing," as
used in the NEGOTIABE INSTRTJMENTS STATUTE, Sec. 9 (3), include the case
of a real person, as payee, not having any right to or interest in the instrument, and who was not intended by the person inserting the name to have
any. Trust Co. of America v. Hamilton Bank, 127 App. Div. 515; Bartlett v.
First National Bank of Chicago, 247 Ill. 49o; Snyder v. Corn Exchange
National Bank, 221 Pa. 599. The case also fits in with the desire expressed
'by Professor Kulp in his article-on the "Fictitious Payee," in 18 MIcx. L.
Rev. 296, 31o, that the courts of the various states should supply the defect
in the NtcoTImnr n INSTRUMENTS STATUT, by uniformly holding on this question as the New York, Illinois, and Pennsylvania courts have. Otherwise the
.NxoOTiA3n. INSTRUlI'-NTs AcT will fail in making uniform a very troublesome question.
BILLS AND NoTEs-REcoVmy oF MoNEy PAID BY DRAWaWON FORGED
INSTRUxMNT-One Sumner, as quartermaster in the army, had authority to
draw drafts on the Treasurer of the United States. His clerk, Howard,
drew such a draft, naming Sumner as payee, and forged Sumner's signature
as drawer. He also unauthorizedly indorsed it with Sumner's name and
negotiated the draft to a bank which sent it to defendant bank for collection
and credit. On presentation to the plaintiff, as drawee, it was paid. Plaintiff,
on discovering the forgery, sued to recover the amount paid to defendant.
Held, one justice dissenting, that plaintiff could not recover. United States
v. Chase National Bank (April i9, i92o), 40 Sup. Ct. 36I.
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It has long been settled that a drawee who pays on a forged bill cannot
recover from a holder in due course. Price v. Neal, 3 Burr. 1354; NEc. INST.
LAW., Sec. 62, "The acceptor * * * admits * * * the existence of the drawer,
the genuineness of his signature, and his capacity and authority to draw the
instrument" McLendon v. Bank of Advance, 188 Mo. App. 417. The theory
generally stated is that the drawee is bound to know the drawer's signature,
though there is some conflict as to the proper theory. See 4 HARv. L. Riv.

297; WOODIWAED, QUASI-CONTRACTS, Sec. 9I. The rule applies to the Treasurer of the United States. United States v. Bank of New York, 219 Fed.
648, L. R. A. 1915, D 797. It is equally well settled that the holder must
have had title to the instrument, otherwise the drawee can recover the money
paid to him, and a forged indorsement does not pass the title to the indorsee.
DANIEL ON NEC. INST., Sec. 1364. If, however, the forged indorsement is on
the bill when issued by the drawer, it is the drawer and not the indorser
through whom the holder derives title. Hortsinanv. Henshaw, ii How. 177.
Also, if the payee named is a fictitious payee, the instrument is payable to
bearer. Governor, etc., v. Vagliano Bros., (H. of L.) [i8gil App. Cas. 107.
As to when a nominal payee is in fact fictitious, see I8 MIcH L. REv. 296.
The principal case appears to put its decision on the first proposition.
CARRIERS-CUMMINS AMENDMENT AS TO LIMITATION or LIABILITY.-Action
for loss of grain on an interstate shipment in November, 1915, under the
uniform bill of lading. This provided that the amount of the loss should
be computed on the basis of the value of the property at the time and place
of shipment. Plaintiff claimed the value at destination, less freight charges,
on the ground that the Cummins Amendment made the above stipulation
void. Held, that the shipper was entitled to recover the full, actual loss.
C. M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. McCaull-Dinsmore Co. (U. S., May 17, 1920,
U. S. -.
The Cummins Amendment became law in March, 1915, and was largely
superseded by the act of August, 1916. This in turn will be succeeded by
legislation by the present Congress. The result is that not many cases under
the Cummins Amendment have reached or are likely to reach courts of last
resort. On previous cases, see 17 MicH L. Rv. 183. The present case holds
that the Cummins Amendment means what it seems to say, viz., that the
carrier is liable to the lawful holder of the bill of lading for the full, actual
loss, no matter how he may seek to modify his liability. A similar attitude
of the court toward the language of the Carmack Amendment would have
prevented most of the litigation reviewed in previous volumes of the RxVIEw
and probably have avoided the Cummins Amendment and other statutes passed
for the very reason that the Carmack Amendment was so emasculated by
judicial interpretation. As to the "Transportation Act of I92O," see U. S.
v. Alaska S. S. Co. (U. S., May 17, 1920, per Day, Justice).

CARRIERS-RAcE SEGREGATION-APPLIcATION TO INTERSTATE CARRIES OF
LAw.--Defendant operates an interstate interurban railway
system between Cincinnati, Ohio, and a point six miles distant in the outSEPARATE COACH
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skirts of Covington, Kentucky. Its cars are solely engaged in interstate trips,
and So per cent of its passengers are interstate. Not over six per cent at
any time are colored, and on a large proportion of the trips there are no
colored passengers. The Kentucky statute requires, and the Ohio forbids,
separate cars or compartments for white and colored passengers. On indictment of defendant for violation of the Kentucky statute, held, not a regulation of interstate commerce; the act affects interstate business incidentally
and does not subject it to unreasonable demands. South Covington & Cincinnati St. Ry. Co. v. Coin. of Ky. (U. S. Supreme Court, April ig, 192o), U. S. -.
Our dual form of government will to the end of time, if it lasts so long,
furnish cases like the present of nice distinctions marking out the limits of
the states in the exercise of police power affecting interstate agencies. Cases
like Ill. Cent. R. Co. v. Public Utilities Com., 245 U. S. 493, and others
reviewed in 16 MICH. L. RZV. 379, seem to leave the state very little of its
police power, but now and again the courts check the tendency toward centralization in the Federal government by a decision like the present. Defendant railway enjoyed a Kentucky franchise granted to a subsidiary company,
but nearly all its business was interstate, and it operated only interstate cars.
There was not enough Kentucky business to justify separate cars, and if it
made separate compartments on all its cars it would violate an Ohio statute,
and the compartments for colored passengers would be empty or nearly so
most of the time. It is not strange that three of the justices concurred in a
dissent written by Mr. Justice Day, calling the statute in question as here
applied an unreasonable regulation and burdensome to interstate commerce.
This dissent derives added interest from the fact that in a case decided, but
a month earlier Mr. justice Day wrote the opinion of the court, upholding
the right of the State of New York to regulate the price of gas piped from
Pennsylvania, on the grotind that state laws regulating matters of local
interest, but affecting interstate commerce, are operative until Congress acts.
Pa. Gas Co. v. Pub. Service Com. (U.S. Sup. Ct., March I, 192o). This
occasional guarding of state control was still more significantly exhibited in
Public Utilities Conz. v. Laudon, 249 U. S. 236, holding that retailing gas
piped into the state from another state was intrastate, and not interstate,
commerce. Our dual form of government is still dual, but the boundaries
between state and federal powers are ever uncertain lines. See the prevailing and dissenting opinions in Pa. L. Co. v. Pub. Service Com. (U. S.
Sup. St., Nov. IO, i919), as to the power of the State of Pennsylvania to
prescribe the equipment for the platform of the rear coach of a train moving
in interstate commerce. The rear car chanced to be a mail car for which
federal authority had prescribed specifications conflicting with the Pennsylvania law. The state had to give way to the federal requirements. But the
significant thing is that, after all these years of attempts to draw the boundary
line, the Supreme Court has divided on so simple a case as this.
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CARRIERS-RATE REGULATIoN-RIGHT TO COMPEL RAILROAD COMMISSION TO
RAISE STREET CAR FARE.-The Jacksonville Traction Company was unable to

operate its street car service under an existing five-cent franchise granted
by the city, without a large deficit. The receiver asked for mandamus to
force the State Railroad Commission to fix a reasonable rate. Held, the
state has power to reduce or increase fares, which power is not affected by
the city ordinance. This power may be exerted through the Railroad Commissioners and mandamus may properly issue to compel their action. State
ex. rel. Triay v. Burr (Fla., I92o), 84 So. 6I.
For discussion of the question involved, see 18 MICH. L. REv. 320.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-ADMIRALTY-STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
AcTs-PowrR or CoNGREs.-The JUDICIAL CODE of the United States (Clause

3, Secs. 24 and 256) provides that United States District Courts are granted
"exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction, saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it, and to claimtants the
rights and remedies under the Workmen's Compensation Law of any State."
Pursuant to this provision, the New York courts granted an award under
the Compensation Law of that state to the family of a bargeman drowned
in Hudson River (226 N. Y. 302). On error in the United States Supreme
Court, held (Holmes, Pitney, Clarke, and Brandeis, JJ., dissenting) the
award improper. Congress had no power to provide for the application
of State Workmen's Compensation Acts to employees engaged in service
within the jurisdiction of admiralty. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart (May
17, 192o),

-

U.

S. -

The words of the JUDICIAL CODE above in italics were added by Congress
in 1917 to take care of the situation as left by the decision in Southern
Pacific Co. v. Jenson (May, 1917), 244 U. S. 205, where it was declared that
"Congress has paramount power to fix and determine the maritime law
which shall prevail throughout the country," and that, "when applied to
maritime injuries, the New York Workmen's Compensation Law conflicts
with the rules adopted by the Constitution, and to that extent is invalid."
It was further held that the saving clause had no application. Discussing
the Jensen case, see 15 MICH. L. Rv. 657; 17 COL. L. REV. 703; 31 HARv. L.
REV. 488; 6 CA,. L. Rv. 69; 2 SOUTH. L. QuAr. 304; 27 YALE L. JOUa. 255.

The principal case now holds that not even Congress can provide for the
application of State Workmen's Compensation Laws to maritime injuries.
In Sudden & Christensen v. Ind. Acc. Comm. (April 12, i92o), 188 Pac. 8o3,
the Supreme Court of California had held the same way. On the general
subject the Constitution provides simply that "The judicial power shall extend
to * * * all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." (Sec. 2, Art III.)
That "Congress has paramount power to fix and determine the maritime law
which shall prevail throughout the country" was conceded even by the

majority in the Jensen case. The principal case must stand, then, on the
ground that Congress had gone too far. But on what basis can the court
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declare that Congress has gone too far? Surely only on the ground that the
Constitution has declared otherwise or has deprived Congress of such legislative power. It is submitted that a constitutional provision declaring the
scope of judicial power cannot in good sense be construed as a limitation
upon the powers of Congress, except as to jurisdiction so granted by the
Constitution. The court says maritime law must be uniform. But the Constitution certainly does not say so. It is not like bankruptcy laws, which
are specifically required to be uniform. If, then, Congress thinks there is
no compelling reason for uniformity on the matter of Compensation Laws
and the court thinks there is, which should prevail? That the court may
declare invalid laws of Congress which are in conflict with the Constitution
cannot be denied since Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch 137. The principal
case, however, is a most glaring instance of the court arrogating unto itself
the power to review the wisdom of an act of Congress. It is submitted that
the decision is not only unsound but is vicious. In the opinion of the court
Mr. Justice McReynolds makes some obscure statements indicating that the
action of Congress was invalid in that there was a delegation of power to
the states. In his dissenting opinion Mr. Justice Holmes fully exposes the
fallacy of this position. It was not a case of delegation but of adoption of
state law making it for the purpose federal law. This has often been done.
See opinion of Mr. Justice Curtis in Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How.
299, on this general problem.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-ORDINANC4 PROHIBITING DISPLAY or FLAG OF
ORGANIZATION ANTAGONISTIC TO FORM or GOVRNMENT-UNcONSTITUTIONAL.In petition for writ of habeas corpus, petitioner had been convicted for violation of an ordinance of Los Angeles which made it unlawful for any person to display or cause or permit to be displayed, publicly or privately, any
flag or device of any nature, representative of any nation, sovereignty or
society, which, in its purposes, practices, official declarations, or by its constitution, by-laws, or regulations, espouses for the government of the people
of the United States principles or theories of government antagonistic to the
Constitution and laws of the United States or to the form of government
thereof as now constituted. Held, such ordinance invalid and unconstitutional
in so far as it prohibits inhabitants of the United States from advocating
peaceable changes in our Constitution, laws or form of government, though
such change may be based on principles antagonistic to those which now
serve as their basis. Ex parte Hartman (Cal., I92O), 188 Pac. 548.
Obviously, the court considers the above ordinance as an infringement of
personal liberty, within the prohibition of the Fourteenth Amendment,
though in fact it refers to no specific constitutional provision, nor does it
cite any authority; it seems much impressed with the suggestion that the
display of a symbol representing some organization proposing such a step
as recall of members of Congress would come within the" prohibition of such
an ordinance, since it would be, to a certain extent, the court says, antagonistic to our present form of government. In Com. v. Karnonen, 219 Mass.
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3o, an ordinance prohibiting the carrying of any red or black flag in parades,
etc., was upheld and declared not to be an infringement of personal liberty
under either the federal or state constitutions, but a legitimate regulation
thereof within the state's police power, as such symbol tended naturally to
produce turbulence and disorder. The ordinance in the principal case is, of
course, broader than the above in its terms, and may be distinguished on
this ground. It is believed that on the weight of reason (authority directly
in point being apparently entirely wanting) the decision is correct. As an
example, it has often been seriously urged that this country should have a
cabinet which would be responsible for its actions to the electorate of the
nation. If an organization were to be formed to promote this step, and
should chance to adopt and use some symbol as representative thereof, this
would clearly come within the prohibition of such a measure. It cannot be
felt that such restrictions are in keeping with our conceptions of personal
liberty. For a general discussion of political crimes, see 18 MIcH. L. lzv.
3o (November, igig), though not bearing directly on this question.
CONTRACr

or EMPLOYMENT-RSTRAINT or TRADP-ENORC4ABILITY 05
AGREEMENT TO REFRAIN VROM USING PSZUDONYM.-The plaintiffs, film producers, employed the defendant as a film actor by a contract
requiring him to act under the pseudonym, "Stewart Rome." It was provided that this pseudonym should be the sole property of the plaintiffs, and
that on the termination of 'the employment the defendant should have no
right to use it for any purpose whatsoever, and that he should refrain from
acting in any capacity for new employers unless and until the latter should
agree in writing not to announce or advertise his performance under this
pseudonym. The defendant, owing partly to his ability and partly to the
plaintiffs' advertisements, acquired a wide reputation under the pseudonym,
and his professional identity became so merged in it that the market value
of his services without it would, for the time being at least, have been diminished by more than fifty per cent. Two years after the termination of the
contract, defendant made an engagement to act under the pseudonym for
rival producers, whereupon plaintiffs brought an action for an injunction.
Held, that the contract was not enforceable because in partial restrain of
trade and not, in the circumstances, reasonably required for the protection
of the employer. Hepworth Manufacturing Co. v. Ryott, L. R. [1g2o], 1
Ch. I.
To the argument that the contract in question is not in restraint of trade
for the reason that under it the defendant is left free to employ his talents
as and where he will, in his own name or under any pseudonym other than
that of "Stewart Rome," the court answered that the name, "Stewart Rome,"
had become as much a part of the defendant's professional equipment as his
skill and ability, and that to deprive him of this item of equipment is to
restrain his freedom of action in trade. Since there was nothing to indicate
that the enforcement of this obligation was reasonably necessary to secure
to the plaintiffs all the benefits to which they were entitled in relation to the

FILmI AcTOR's
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films owned by them in which the defendant had starred, the usual presumption, that a contract in restraint of trade is unenforceable, was applied.
Restrictive agreements accompanying the promisor's entry into an apprenticeship arrangement, or made upon his going into the service of the promisee,
are regarded with disfavor by the courts. They are upheld only when they
are not unduly oppressive, when they are of a kind clearly necessary to
enable the promisor to dispose of his labor to the best advantage, and when
they do not interfere with the public interest. This means that a restriction
to be upheld in such a case must, on the one hand, be no broader than is
reasonably necessary to protect the legitimate interests of the promisee, and,
on the other hand, must be one which does not unduly interfere with the
interest which the public has in having every man self-supporting, and in
getting the benefit of his labor, skill and talent. An agreement which seeks
to protect the employer's business and good will by preventing the employee
from using trade secrets and other information gained in the course of his
employment to the disadvantage of the employer, if reasonably adapted to
,that end, is enforceable. A promise to refrain, for a limited time, from working for a rival, or from setting up a competing business, may be of this kind.
Rousillon v. Rousillon (i88o), L. R. 14, Ch. Div. 351; Carter v. Ailing, 43
Fed. 2o8; Harrison v. Glucose Sugar Refining Co, 116 Fed. 3o4. But competition which does not involve the use of information and good will so
gained cannot be restricted in this way. Sarnuel- Stores Inc. v. Abrams
(Conn., i9i), io8 Atl. 541; Herbert Morris, Ltd., v. Saxelby, [1916]
i A. C. 688. Neither can the employee be restrained from exercising personal skill and ability acquired as a result of his employment. Herbert Morris,
Ltd., v. Saxelby, [1916] I A. C. 688. See also the following cases in which
the restriction was held to be unenforceable because broader than necessary to protect the employer's interests: Herreshoff v. Boutineau, 17 R. I. 3;
Kinney v. Scarborough Co. (Ga., 1912), 74 S. R. 772; Mason v. Provident
Clothing and Supply Co., [19131, A. C. 724.
CONTPRACTS-IMiPOSSIBILITY-EPLOyE'S

RIGHT To SALARY WHgN

SCHOOL

O AN EPIDEmI.-The plaintiff, who was employed
by the defendant, a school district, to transport pupils to and from school,
brought an action to recover salary for a period of four months during which
the school had been closed at the order of the state health authorities to prevent the spread of an epidemic of influenza. Held: (i) That the school cannot be said to have been closed by operation of law, since the state board of
health has no authority, under the statutes in force in the state, to order
schools to be closed. This is a matter which rests entirely in the discretion
of the local school board. (2) The defendant is liable to the plaintiff for his
salary, as the contract has not become impossible of performance. Crane v.
School District No. 14 of Tillamook County (Ore., 1920), 188 Pac. 712.
It is obvious that the contract was not impossible of performance if we
assume what the court held, viz., that the closing of the school was a purely
voluntary act on defendant's part. There is, however, authority for the propoIS CLOSED ON ACCOUN'
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sition that a threatened impossibility, at least where the health or safety of

human beings is involved, excuses performance, provided the case is one in
which actual impossibility of performance would itself excuse. Lakeman v.
Pollard, 43 Me. 463; The Kronprinzessin, Cecilie, 244 U. S. 12. See also
Liston v. Steamship Carpathian, [1915] 2 Y. B. 42; Hanford v. Conn. Fair
Ass'n (Conn., 1918), xO3 Atl. 838. Unless it can be said that the plaintiff's
salary was payable as a retainer and not for work done, it would seem to
follow that the actual illness of all the pupils would excuse performance
by the defendant. In that event, plaintiff would not be entitled to salary
because he could not perform the condition precedent upon which his right
to salary depends. So where the school was closed by operation of law
and there were no pupils to be taught for that reason, the teacher was held
not entitled to salary. School District No. 16 of Sherman County v. Howard
(Nebr., I9O4), 98 N. W. 666. If this argument is sound, then the impossibility threatened in the principal case, on the authorities cited supra, would
seem to justify the action taken by the defendant and to excuse it from any
obligation to the plaintiff. In accord with the principal case, see Dewey v.
The Union School District,43 Mich. 480; School District No. 16 of Sherman
County v. Howard, supra (setmble). These cases may perhaps be justified
on the ground that the contracts of such employees, properly construed, are,
after all, retainer contracts, and that the school district has assumed the risk.
At any rate, if the teacher, at the request of the school authorities, keeps himself in readiness to teach at all times, he is entitled to salary. Libby v. Inhabitants of Douglas, 175 Mass. 128.
COVENANTS FOR TITL-SEISIN-WHAT AMOUNTS TO BREAcH-The
grantees of land, being tenants by entirety under a deed with covenant of
seisin, entered into a contract for the sale of it; the purchaser from the
grantees repudiated the contract and obtained judgment for an advance payment and costs on the ground that the title was not marketable. The defendants notified their grantors of the action, but they refused to defend the suit.
In an action by the surviving grantee it was held that the grantors were liable
for breach of the covenant of seisin. Hilliker v. Rueger (N. Y., 192O), 126
N. R. Rep. 266.
It is generally held in the United States that the covenant of seisin, if
broken at all, is broken as soon as made. But the courts are not in accord
as to the scope of the covenant, the majority holding as in the principal case
that it means lawfully seized in fee simple. A few states hold it to be
satisfied by an exclusive possession with claim of fee. Bearce v. Jackson, 4
Mass. 4o8; Montgomery v. Reed, 69 Me. 51o; Scott v. Twist, 4 Nebr. 133;
Watts v. Parker, 27 Ill. 22-3; Peters v. Bowman, 98 U. S. 56. See RAw',E,
COVENANTS FOR

TITLE, 38-65.

According to Backus v. McCoy, 3 Ohio

211,

Stambaugh v. Smith, 23 Oh. St. 588, and Brooks v. Mohl, 1O4 Minn. 4o4, the
covenant is satisfied if the grantor is in possession claiming a fee, but that
there is a breach when the grantee or those claiming under him is evicted.
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McLennan v. Prentice, 85 Wis. 427, holds that when the grantee has been
put into possession a breach of the covenant of seisin entitles him only to
nominal damages unless evicted.
CRIMINAL LAW-INTENT PagsuFD vROm NATURAL REsuLT op ACT IS
RPBUTrABL.-Defendant was convicted under Espionage Act for utterances
made in a public speech; he not only denied making the statements alleged
but specifically denied that he ever entertained any intent to obstruct the
recruiting service or to attempt to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny
and refusal of duty in the military or naval forces-which specific intent was
apparently necessary to conviction in the present action. The proof of the
prosecution rested mainly upon the words themselves, coupled with their
utterance to 'a crowd of people, and their natural and probable effect upon
such auditors. Held, under such circumstances, an instruction that a man
cannot say that he did not intend to do a certain thing when such thing was
the natural result of his act, erroneous. Bental v. U. S. (C. C. A., 8th Cir.,
1919), 262 Fed. 744.
This case admits the general principle so often laid down that where one
knowingly does an act (including utterance of words), the presumption
arises that he intended the results which would naturally follow. See Reynolds v. U. S., 98 U. S. 145; U. S. v. Breese, 173 Fed. 402; U. S. v. McClare,
26 Fed. Cas. No. I5659. But further says that where the act must be "knowingly and willfully" done, as here, this presumption, while constituting strong
evidence, is not conclusive but rebuttable; citing Hicks v. U. S., i5o U. S. 447;
and the testimony of defendant that he intended no such result may be so
received in rebuttal thereof. Above instruction was held erroneous because
it practically negatived such testimony on his part. See on this point I WHARTON ON CRim. Evi. [ioth Ed.], § 431. There was a dissent in this case, proceeding on the ground that this instruction constituted merely the opinion
of the court on the weight of the evidence, as permissible in Federal practice; see Freese v. Keinplay, 118 Fed. 428; further, that as such opinion it
was obviously true, and the jury being cautioned that they were the exclusive judges of all questions of fact and were not to be governed by any
expressions of the court, that thus there was no error in the instruction.
Also that for the jury really to give any effect to the defendant's testimony
under the circumstances of this case would make such criminal prosecution
a farce. If, in form, the instruction here did constitute merely a comment
on the weight of the evidence, probably this dissent is correct. So far as
can be ascertained from the report, however, it is given in the ordinary form
of an instruction. As such it practically excludes from the consideration of
the jury all testimony of the defendant as to his intention, and would seem
on this ground to be erroneous. See I WHARTON, CRIM. EVi. [ioth Ed.],
§ 431, which, speaking of testimony of a defendant as to his intent, is as follows: "While such answers are not conclusive, they cannot be ignored, but
must be considered in connection with all the other evidence in the case.
Where an instruction requires the jury to ignore such statements it is error."

RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS
See also People v. Szveeney, 55 Mich., 586, "where the intent is the gist of the
crime, the presumption (of intending the natural consequences of one's acts),
though a very important circumstance, is not conclusive nor alone sufficient."
But, on the other hand, for a case apparently holding such constructive intent
on
to be alone sufficient, see Abrams v. U. S., 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 17, and note
since
that
however,
seem,
certainly
would
It
same in 18 MICH. L. REv. 236.
the almost universal condemnation of the suggested rule of disqualification
of one from testifying to his own intent (see I WIGMORZ ON EVI,, § 581),
allowed to
if this result is not to be in effect nullified, a court should not be
instruct the jury to disregard such testimony. It would seem more logical
prethat all the evidence bearing on the question of intent, including the
sumption discussed in the principal case and the defendant's own testimony,
or
should be left wholly to the consideration of the jury, with such cautions
of
circumstances
the
and
practice
particular
the
as
court
the
by
comments
the case would permit of. See Oakes v. State, 98 Miss. 97.
- DIvoRc-ALIMONY-ALLOWANCz

BASED

ON

FUTURE

EARNINGS-In

a

divorce proceeding permanent alimony was awarded the wife on the authority
shall
of a statute providing, "When a divorce shall be granted * * * the wife
be * * * allowed such alimony as the court shall think reasonable," etc. The
allowance was such that it obviously was based upon earning capacity, and
the husband appealed on the ground that the statute did not authorize such
judgment. Held, the statute did not prevent alimony awarded on such basis.
Nixon v. Nixon (Kans., i92o), 188 Pac. 227.
A similar conclusion on a statute very much like the one in Kansas was
reached in Lape v. Lape (Ohio, igig), 124 N. E. 51. For discussion thereof,
see i8 MICH. L. Rzv. 6o. It may very well be that such statutes grew in the first
instance out of a desire for a wider power in the court in awarding alimony,
it being generally considered that in absence of statutory authorization courts
were without power to set off a particular portion of the husband's property.
However, in Cizek v. Cizek, 69 Neb. 797, it was held that under a statute providing that "the court may further decree to her (the wife) such part of the
personal estate of the husband and such alimony out of his estate as it shall
deem just and reasonable," etc., a decree directing the husband to deed certain lots to the wife was beyond the court's power. See, too, Bacon v. Bacon,
43 Wis. 203. After the decision in Wilson. v. Wilson, 67 Minn. 448, which
is contra to the principal case, the statute was amended. Haskell v. Haskell,
i1g Minn. 484, was decided after the amendment.
EMINENT DOMAIN-BENEVITS WHICH MAY BE SET

On?

AGAINST DAMAGES.

condemned land for right of way over defendant's property.
-Appellant
Respondents were allowed damages for value of land taken. On appeal to
the District Court, respondents were awarded substantial damages for severance. On appeal to the Supreme Court, appellants contended for the right
to set off the increased value of respondents' land and benefits thereto by
reason of the building and maintenance of the road, depot and side-tracks
partially on the land of one of the respondents. Held, general benefits such

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
as these could not be set off. Gallatin Valley Electric Railway v. Neible ct al.
(Mont, igig), 186 Pac. 689.
In Geohegan et al. v. Union Elevated Railway R. Co. et al. (Ill., 192o),
126 N. E. 763, the court held, in assessing damages caused by the construction
of an elevated railway, evidence of traffic and resulting benefits to offset such
damages is not restricted to the station in the same block, but may include
others on the line.
It is now generally conceded that benefits accruing by reason of the'taking
and improving of property by a municipality or public utility may be set off
against the remainder in. compensation for damages thereto. City of Birmingham v. Kennedy (1913), 9 Ala. App. 541; Rogers v. City of New London
(1915), 89 Conn. 343; City of Atlanta v. Glenn (I916), 17 Ga. App. 619; Oil
Belt Ry. Co. v. Lewis (1913), 259 Ill. io8; Music v. Sandy & K. R. R. Co.
(I915), 163 Ky. 628; In re Aikiem. (1914), 262 Mo. 403; Long Island R. Co.
v. State (I913), 141 N. Y. S. 687 (affirmed, 218 N. Y. 661) ; Cox v. Philadel-

phia, H. & P. R. R. Co. (igo6), 215 Pa. 5o6; Columbia Heights Realty Co.
v. Rudolph et al. (191o), 31 D. C. App. 112 (affirmed, 217 U. S. 547; In re
Queen Anne Boulevard (1913), 77 Wash. 91; Morrison v. Fairmont & C.
Traction Co. (igo6), 6o W. Va. 441; Zwietusch v. Village of East Milwaukee
(1915), z61 Wis. 519. In Bailey v. Town of Clinton (i9II), 88 S. C. II8,
the court allowed both general and special benefits to be set off against the
remainder. Under constitutional or statutory provisions some states do not
allow a public utility the right to set off benefits, though some of them afford
this right to municipalities. St. Louis I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Theo. Maxfleld
Co. (i9IO), 94 Ark. 135, decided under CoNsT., ART. XII, Ste. 9; KIRBY's
'DIGEST, Sec. 2953; Smith v. Missouri Pacific (1913), 90 Kans. 757, decided
under CoNsT., ART. XII, SEc. 4, GENERAI STATUTES, 1909, Sec. 18oo; City of
Tacoma v. Wetherby (19o8), r Wash. 295, under CovsT., Aa'r. XVI, Snc. I;
City of Spokane v. Thompson (1912), 69 Wash. 650, under CONST., ART. I,
Snc. 16; REm & BAL.. COne, Sec. 7782. A few states allow special benefits to
be set off against both damages to remainder, and the part taken, i. e., the
criterion, is the difference between the value of the property before and after
taking in view of the new conditions. City of Paragouldv. Milner (1914),
114 Ark. 334 (this does not apply to public utilities) ; New York, N. H. R.
Co. v. City of New Haven (914), 81 Conn. 581; Indianapolis & Cincinnati
Traction Co. v. Wiles (igio), 174 Ind. 236; Custer Township v. Dawson
1914), 178 Mich. 367, decided under PuBLIc AcTs, 19o9, No. 283. The following cases have expressly held that property actually taken must be paid for,
irrespective of damage to the remainder: Chattahoochee Valley R. Co. v.
Bass (I911), 9 Ga. App. 83; Oil Belt Ry. Co. v. Lewis, supra; 'Traction Co.
v. Svara (1913), 133 La. 90o; Hoffman v. City of Philadelphia (igi5), 25o
Pa. I. In Broadway Coal Mining Co. v. Smith (191o), 136 Ky. 725, a provision in the Kentucky Statutes (19o9), Sec. 4292, requiring general benefits
to be set off against damages, was held to contravene Section 13 of the state
constitution. While these citations are in nowise exhaustive, they indicate
the nature of the conflict on the general question. The question involved in
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the Geohegan Case differs from these cases only in so far as it does not
involve the actual taking of property but only the interference with an easement of light and air, so that any benefits where allowed must be set off
against the value of the easement. In Bohm v. Metropolitanl Elevated Ry.
Co. (1892), 129 N. Y. 576, the court held general benefits resulting from the
construction of the road as well as special benefits might be so set off. In
App. 449,
an earlier Illinois case, Brand v. Union Elevated Co. (I913), 169 Ill.
aff'd. 258 IlL 133, the court concluded in acordance with the instant case;
see also Rourke v. Home Street Ry. Co. (Mo., igi), 177 S. W. 1102.
The question as to what constitutes direct benefits lends itself to varied
interpretations. In LEwis, EMIN4IT DOMAIN [3rd Ed.], Secs. 687-693, inclusive, the author suggests a classification embracing all the conflicting decisione
through i9o8. The decisions since then have not materially lessened the conflict. The whole question is largely one of local policy, and except from an
abstract point of view the conflict is of no great importance as long as each
state maintains uniformity of its own decisions.
EscRows-Ncgss.TY or BINDING CoNTRAc.-Defendant and plaintiff
entered into a verbal contract whereby the former agreed to make an oil and
gas lease to the latter, the consideration being a cash payment of $5,ooo and
certain promises contained in the lease. The lease, signed by the defendant,
but not by plaintiff, was left with a bank with the understanding that plaintiff
was to call "at the bank the next morning to pay the sum of $5,oo to Cooper
(defendant) and get the lease." Later the same day defendant notified the
bank not to deliver the lease, and next morning, when plaintiff tendered the
$5,o0o, delivery of the lease was refused. In action for specific performance
it was held that the verbal contract was unenforceable by reason of the
statute of frauds, and that the deposit in escrow was not, therefore, irrevocable. Blue v. Conner (Tex. Civ. App., 1920), 219 S. W. 533.
This case follows the doctrine of Campbell v. Thomas, 42 Wis. 437, a
doctrine which is believed to be indefensible. See "Is A CONTRAcT N=cEssARY
To AN EscRow?" in 16 MIcH L. RI.M 569.
INSURANcE-DATH WHILE IN MILITARY SERVic.-A life insurance policy
provided that it should "be incontestable * * * except for naval or military
service in time of war, without permit, which are risks not assumed by the
company, provided that, in case of the death of the insured while engaged
in such service, without permit, the amount payable hereunder shall be the
reserve on the policy at date of death, etc." The insured was inducted into
the military service of the United States pursuant to the Selective Service
law, and died at Camp Custer of pneumonia. In an action by his administrator to recover face value of the policy, it was held, the company was not
liable. Ruddock v. Detroit Life Insurance Company (Mich., 1920), 177 N.
W. 242.
The question involved in this case is discussed at considerable length,
supra, p. 686.
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LANDLORD AND T4NANT-BREACH OP COVENANT TO WORK OUT ROAD TAX-

Du4 To CHANGE IN LAw.-The plaintiff leased
his farm to the defendant from 1912 to 1917, the lessee undertaking to share
the crops and work out the road tax. In 1913 a statute was enacted which
required all road taxes to be paid in cash. The plaintiff, following the defendant's refusal, paid the road taxes for the four remaining years of the term.
In an action by the plaintiff on the written lease, it was held, that the amount
paid was recoverable in the form of damages for breach of contract, notwithstanding the intervening impossibility raised by the statute. Mascall v. Reitmeier (Minn., i92O), 176 N. W. 486.
It is the generally accepted rule that impossibility created by subsequent
legal enactment will excuse performance, and, in the case of executory contracts, will, in effect, wholly discharge the parties from their agreement. 3
PAGE, CONTRACTS, 2127; Cordes v. Miller, 39 Mich. 581. But the same author
points out that impossibility is not to be considered as the equivalent of performance, where the consideration on one side has ben wholly executed, and
performance on the other side has been rendered impossible. 3 PAGE, CONTRACTS, 2115. The problem, presented by the principal case, does not involve
so much the right as it does the remedy. The decision allows the plaintiff
to recover damages for the defendant's refusal to perform what he had not
agreed to do. But, in accord with the decision in the principal case, damages
were allowed for a tenant's failure to perform his covenant to erect a frame
dwelling after a statute had prohibited the erection of frame buildings in
the district. Rooks v. Seaton, I Phila. io6. If the facts of the principal case
presented a possibility of obtaining specific performance, a more proper
remedy would seem to be a bill in equity for specific performance or damages
in the alternative. See Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co. v. Crowe, 156 Ky. 27,
where compensation was awarded in lieu of an annual pass, the issuance of
which the HEPBURN ACT had rendered illegal; and German Society v. Philadelphia, 9 Phila. 245, where the lessee was ordered to pay the equivalent of
a tax to the lessor in compliance with his covenant to discharge all taxes,
after the property had been exempted from taxation. Or, perhaps, a recovery might be had in quasi contract on thei theory that there had been a failure of consideration. Strjckland v. Turner, 7 Ex. 2o6; Briggs v. Vanderbilt,
19 Barb. =-_. But the fact that the unperformed part of the consideration was
not apportionable might raise an obstruction to such relief. WOODWARD,
It might be well to consider, in connection with the
QUASI CONTRACTS, 2o4.
principal case, that where the law renders impossible the performance of the
lessor's covenant for quiet enjoyment the tenant is not allowed to recover
damages in an action for breach of the covenant. Baily v. De Crespigny, L.
P- 4 Q. B. i8o; Ellis v. Welch, 6 Mass. 246. In this respect, the remedies
of landlord and tenant, as against each other, do not appear to be reciprocal.
A Pennsylvania county court decision allowed the lessor to rescind the lease
and bring ejectment where a statute rendered the tenant's performance impossible. Rooks v. Seaton, supra. If this authority is to be relied on, there
INTERVENING IMPOSSIBILITY
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might be reason in refusing all relief whatever to the present plaintiff, allowing him to rest on his neglected remedy. At all events, perhaps it may be
said of the principal case that "the end justifies the means."
LANDLORD AND TENANT-HoLDING OVER ATER TaRm NoT RIZNZWAL OR
EXTENSION OF LxAsz-Lease contained a covenant that if the lease were

extended or renewed the lessee would reimburse the lessor for improvements
made during the term. The lessee held over and the lessor elected to consider
him a tenant from year to year and lessor sued to recover for improvements
made. Held, holding over does not operate as an extension or renewal within
the meaning of the lease. Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. The American Car
and Foundry Co. (C. C. A., 7th Circ., igig), 262 Fed. 757.
The court based its decision, partly at least, upon technical definitions of
renewal and extension, and maintained that a holding over is not a renewal,
for the word renewal implies the execution of a new lease. This view ,of a
renewal is supported in Leavitt v. Maykel, 203 Mass. 506. But in Raulet v.
Cook, 44 N. H-1.512, it was decided that a renewal clause does not require the
execution of a new lease, and in The Insurance Co. v. The National Bank of
Missouri, 7i Mo. 6o, the court doubted whether any distinction could be
drawn between renewal and extension clauses and that neither required a
new lease be executed. Still another position was taken in Kollock v. Scribner, 98 Wis. io4, where both extension and renewal clauses were regarded as
contemplating the execution of a new lease. In the principal case the court
further 'distinguishes a holding over from an extension on the ground that
an extension in the absence of express stipulation involves a continuation of
the tenancy for the same term. Kollock v. Scribner, supra. The second
ground assigned by the court seems much more satisfactory and is based on
rlore widely recognized rules of law. The terms renewal and extension imply
a continuation of the relation springing out of express contract, while a
holding over and the resulting tenancy from year to year has as its foundation not an express contract, since a notice by the tenant to the landlord will
not prevent the creation of the tenancy, but has variously been described as
a relation created by operation of law, Mason v. Wierenga's Estate, 113 Mich.
151, or by an implied condition of the lease. Herter v. Mullen, i59 N. Y. 28.
The writer has been unable to find any case deciding the express point in
issue. In Right d. Flower v. Darby, i Term Rep. i59, Lord Mansfield speaks
of a holding over and the resulting tenancy as a "renovation" and a renewal
of the agreement, and in The Clinton Wire Cloth Co. v. Gardner, 99 I11. 151,
the court says that by holding over there is a presumption of a renewal of
the tenancy. However, these dicta were in no measure necessary or impor-

tant to the decision and should hardly be regarded as controlling.
LANDLORD AND TXNANT-TNANT DRAyr--LIABILITY FOR RENT.-Defend-

ant, being lessee of premises, was compelled to abandon same before the
expiration of the term by reason of his being drafted and inducted into the
United States Army. Plaintiff, the lessor, thereupon relet the premises for
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.the rest of the term at a lower rental, and now prosecutes this action to
recover the difference. Held, no recovery can be had. State Realty Co. v.
Greenfield (192o), 181 N. Y. S. 511.
The court cites and recognizes the rule of the early English case of
Paradinev. Jane, Aleyn, 26, to the effect that "Where the law creates a duty
or charge, and the party is disabled to perform it without any default in him,
and hath no remedy over, there the law will excuse him, * * * but when the
party by his own contract creates a duty or charge upon himself, he is bound
to make it good, if he may, notwithstanding any accident by inevitable necessity, because he might have provided against it by his contract." But this
rule, says the court, has no application where performance becomes impossible by a change of law or by reason of action taken under governmental
authority. The opposite view is held in London & Northern Estates Co. v.
Schlesinger, [1916] I K. B. 20, noted in 14 Micr. L. Riv. 692, where the
lessee, an Austrian, was interned. No reason appears why the decision in
the instant case could not have been instifid upon the authority of Gray v.
Kaufman Dairy & Ice Cream Co., 162 N. Y. 388, 49 L. R. A. 580, wherein
it is held that if the premises are relet by the Icssor during the continuance
of the original term a surrender by operation of law is thereby effected. But
this point is not considered by the court, which bases its decision squarely
upon the ground that the case under consideration forms an exception to the
doctrine of Paradine v. Jane.
PuBLIC BUSiNES--CoURT R-ZVIW OF REGULATION Or

RAus.-By statute

in Oklahoma, when any business is a virtual monopoly, and is such that the
public must use it, or is of public consequence, or affects the community at
large in ways named, it is declared to be a public business and subject to be
controlled by the state, by the Corporation Commission, or by any district
court of the state, as to rates, etc. Complainant sought to enjoin the Corporation Commission from an attempted regulation of rates for laundry work.
Held, that a temporary injunction should be granted restraining the commission from enforcing any penalties, and that the federal district court should
proceed with the suit to determine whether the rates fixed by the commission
were confiscatory. Oklahoma Operating Co. v. Love (U. S. Sup. Ct., 1920),
40 Sup. Ct. 338.
This case is one of the numerous and still growing progeny of Munn v.
Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, as modified by Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co.
v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418, and many other cases. The decision in the
instant case goes on the unconstitutionality of parts of the Oklahoma statute
because the only method of judicial review of the findings of the commission
which the statute provided is that arising in proceedings to punish for contempt. The party must first violate the order, so as to be cited for contempt,
and then if he fails to purge himself he thereupon becomes liable to the
penalties provided. Such a judicial review is not due process of law. Citing
Ex parte Young, 209 U1 S. 123, 147, and other cases. The actual decision
on the above point seems far less interesting than the implications as to
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what may constitute a public business, for the court by directing the suit to
proceed seems to assume that the commission or a court can by declaration
within the statute make washing clothes or ginning cotton a public business.
When Munn v. Illinois, supra, said "when one devotes his property to a use
in which the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has thus created," conservative
property opinion was shocked. The public has an interest in every business
that contributes to feeding and clothing mankind, not to speak of many less
essential businesses. When does that interest become such as to make the
business a public use? The owners of the great grain elevators in Chicago,
the "gateway of commerce" for the great grain producing states, "pursue a
public employment." So do the elevator men in the smaller' gateway at Buffalo. People v. Budd, 117 N. Y. I, affirmed 143 U. S. 517, and the owners
of elevators in the small Dakota towns, Brass v. North Dakota, 153 U. S. 391.
Pipe lines carrying oil may be treated as "common" carriers. Telegraph companies though not common carriers, are public utilities, Telegraph Co. v. Griswold, 37 Ohio St. 301; and so are companies furnishing water, Lumbard v.
Stearns, 4 Cush. 6o; gas,--Williams v. Mutual Gas Co., 52 Mich. 499; electricity, for power as well as light,-Jones v. No. Ga. Electric Co., 125 Ga. 618;
to mention only a few instances. And the "business of insurance has very
definite characteristics" of a business affected with a public interest, German
Alliance Insurance Co. v. Lewis, 223 U. S. 389. The fierce opposition to this
development of public interest in businesses is vigorously expressed in the
dissenting opinions of Field J. in the Munn Case, of Peckham J. in the Budd
Case in New York, and Brewer J. in the same case and in the Brass Case
before the United States Supreme Court. The Missouri court in State v.
Associated Press, 159 Mo. 410, very vigorously and scathingly summed up the
case against these extensions of public callings, and declined to follow the
Illinois court in holding that the business of the Associated Press in gathering
news charged it with a public interest, Inter-Ocean Publishing Co. v. Associated Press, 184 Ill. 438. In the case last cited the court did not wait for the
legislature to declare news gathering a public business, but in general the
courts add to the list of the public callings only as the legislature speaks.
Ladd v. Southern Cotton Press etc. Co., 53 Tex. 172. The implications of the
instant case seem to be that the legislature may make ginning cotton and
laundering public businesses, and no intimation is offered that the Oklahoma
Commission may not add to the list any others which it may determine "by
reason of their nature, extent, or the exercise of a virtual monopoly therein"
to be public, and subject to control by the State. Furthermore, no objection is
offered to allowing the legislature, within limits fixed by statute, to delegate
to a commission or to a court the power to determine when a business becomes public. As this question is not directly noticed in the opinion inferences in this direction should doubtless be made with caution. But if it is not
permissible to grant to the commission such legislative power, it is difficult to
see why the suit'should not have been settled, instead of continued. Finally,
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as is well illustrated by the recent decision in Producers Transport Co. v.
Railroad Corn. (U. S. Supt. Ct. Jan. 5, I92O), there will always be a judicial
review of a statute, or order of a commission, declaring any business public. If the business was solely to serve particular persons, and was never
devoted to public use, no legislative fiat, or order of a commission, could possibly make it public.

PUBLIc UTIITY RATrg--OBLIGATION OF CONTRACT RuIX AS AGAINST THX
COMPANY.-A gas company proposed to increase above the rates agreed upon
between the city and the company the charge for gas furnished by the company. The company contended that because of conditions occasioned by the
World War the present rates caused an actual loss in operation of the plant.
The city claimed an irrevocable contract for fifty years, and by ordinance forbade any increase. From denial by the court below of injunction against the
city, the company appeals. Held, the company is entitled to injunctive relief.
Knoxville Gas Co. v. Knoxville, 261 Fed. 283.
The present note is supplemental to 17 MICH. L. Rrv. 429 and 18 ib. 32o.
The controlling question in the principal case is whether the city had power
by contract irrevocably to fix the price of gas for fifty years. In Detroit v.
Detroit St. Ry., 184 U. S. 368, and in Cleveland v. Cleveland City Ry., 194 U.
S. 517, it was almost assumed that municipalities had such power. In Home
Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles, 211 U. S. 265, and later in Milwaukee v. Milwaukee
Elec. Ry. v. Wis. R. Corn., 238 U. S. 174, and Columbus R. R. & L. Co. v.
Columbus, 2Ao U. S. 399, the court sharply restricted this power to cases
where the legislature had renounced in favor of the municipality this sovereign right of police power "by terms so clear and unequivocal as to permit
of'no doubt as to their proper construction." Following this rule the court
in the instant case held that the city of Knoxville had no such power, and
hence the rates were subject to revision. There are now enough decisions, and
the number is growing very fast these days of rising costs, to justify confidence in certain conclusions. As already pointed out, a municipality is a
subordinate political subdivision of the state, with no such power unless it has
been very clearly, perhaps expressly, given. State v. Burr (Fla., i92O) 84
So. 61; Traverse City v. R. Coin. (Mich., I918), 168 N. W. 481. Even when the
legislature has permitted the municipality to fix rates, still the legislature is
presumed supreme, and in general may itself, or by a utility commission, revise those rates without the consent of the city. State v. Burr (Fla., 192o)
84 So. 61; Milwaukee v. R. Coin., P. U. R. 192o B. 976, 98o. But compare
Re Lincoln Water Co., P. U. R. 1919 B. 752, 770; Colliugswood Sewerage Co.
v. Collingswood, (N. J., 1918) 1O2 Atl. goi; Re Petition for Increase of Street
Car Fares, (N. C., 1gig) ioi S. R. 61g. It has been said the city is a mere
agent and the principal and third party may always revise the contract without
leave from the agent. But this hardly expresses the fact, for the agent here
contracts for his own benefit, and he and not the principal has to pay the
cost. Surely a mere agent in such a case has a right to be a party. State ex
rel. Indianapolis T. & T. Co. v. Lewis, (Ind., I918), 12o N. E. I2g. It is
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better to rest the rule on the police power of the state, ordinarily exercised bythe legislature, and which there is no presumption the legislature has renounced. It may be questioned whether the legislature can renounce it
Clearly the people, through the Constitution might lodge this limited power
with the municipalities. Atlantic Coast Line v. Goldsboro, 232 U. S. 548;
Union Dry Goods Co. v. Ga. Pub. Serv. Corp., 248 U. S- 372; Chicago Rys.
Co. v. Chicago (Illinois, I92o), 176 N. E. 584; State v. Burr (Fla., 1920) 84
So. 6I; In Re Guilford Water Co's. Service Rates (Me., 1919), 1O8 Atl. 446;
Re Butler-Hill Tel. Co. (Mo., 192o) P. U. R. 192o B 6o4, 615, citing Missouri
decisions; Mill Creek Coal and Coke Co. v. Pub. Serv. Coin. (W. Va., 1919),
100 S. E. 557. Arkansas, Ohio, Michigan, Iowa and some other states seem
to have statutory or constitutional home rule provisions giving municipalities
large power, including this. InterurbanR. & T. Co. v. Pub. Utilities Com.
(Ohio, 1918), 12o N. E. 831; Lima v. Pub. Utilities Corn. (Ohio, I919), 126 N.
- 318; Conwke v. Bransford & Son (Ark., i919), 216 S. V. 38; Selkirk v.
Sioux City G. & E. Co. (Ia., I92O), 176 N. W. 3Ol; Lenawee Co. Gas & E.
Co. v. Adrian, (Mich., 192o), 176 N. W. 596, pointing out that the Michigan
statute exempts from change by the Commission of contract rates. Cf. Karainazoo v. Circuit Judge, 2oo Mich. 146, and Traverse City v. R. Coin. (Mich.,
1918) 168 N. W. 481, holding no power had been delegated to Traverse City
to fix rates. This was followed in Kalamazoo v. Titus (Mich., i919), 175
N. W. 48o, and in Detroit v. R. Cont. (Mich., 192O), 177 N. W. 3o6. In most
states, however, the legislative power at most is merely suspended, and may
again be exercised at any time. In re Searsport Water Co. (Me., I919), io8 AUt.
452; Re Hackensack Water Co., P. U. P. 192o C. i6b. And in many states no
such power has ever been given to municipalities. It is never to be presumed.
Chicago Rys. Co. v. Chicago (Illinois, 1920), 126 N. E. 585; State Pub. Utilities Coin. v. Quincy (Illinois, I919), 125 N. B. 374. And neither private individuals, nor the company can by making contracts for service prevent the
exercise by the state of its sovereign power to fix such rates. Producers'Transportation Co. v. R. Com. of Cdlif. (U. S., 1920), 40 Sup. Ct. 131; Union Dry
Goods Co. v. Ga. Pub. Service Cont., 248 U. S. 372; Edis6n Storage Battery
Co. v. Pub. Utility Com. (N. J., ipi9), io8 AtI. 241; Ohio & Colorado Smelting & Refitning Co. v. Pub. Utilities Com. (Col., 1920), 187 Pac. 1082; it Re
Guilford Water Co.'s Service Rates (Me., I919), io8 AUt. 446; Biddeford &
Saco Water Co. v. Itself (Me., i92o), P. U. R. 192o B. 586, 590, Mill Creek
Coal & Coke Co. v. Pub. Serv. Cong (W. Va., 1919), too S. E. 557. The
right of the Commission to change contract rates extends to contracts to
furnish the city service free or at reduced rates. Hillsboro v. Pub. Serv. Com.
(Ore., i92O), 187 Pac. 617; Winfield v. Pub. Serv. Coin. (Ind., 1918), 118 N.
E. 531. This power in the legislature to regulate rates may extend to utilities
owned by the municipality. A recent case held that the statute there involved
did not extend to such utilities. Barnes Laundry Co. v. Pittsburgh (Pa.,
1920), lop At. 535. And the many late cases denying the city the benefit of
contract fixed rates are a few leaving the city some control. The Virginia
Commission refused to authorize an electric company to increase rates above
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those fixed in the franchise. Coin. of Va. v. Virginia-Western P. Co., P. U.
R. i918 F. 79i, reviewing many cases and noting their seeming inconsistencies.
See also Jamestown v. Pa. Gas Co., 263 Fed. 437.
QUASI CONTRAc-PLAINTIFF'S SERvIcEs RiESULTING IN GIVr

To DEFENDANT.

-A county let to defendant a contract for construction of a drainage ditch.
Under the statutes, the county engineer, with the consent of the auditor,
might require extra work, not exceeding ten per cent of the bid. Defendant
sublet the whole job to plaintiff, with a stipulation that it would pay plaintiff
for extra work "required to be done by the engineer" 9q/s cents per yard.
The engineer, without the concurrence of the auditor, called for extra work
in excess of ten per cent, and plaintiff did this work in ignorance of the
engineer's want of authority. The county paid defendant for the extra work
$3,152, which was in excess of the ten per cent limitation but considerably short
of the value bf the work, which, computed on the basis of plaintiff's contract, amounted to $5,589. Held, that defendant could not have enforced any
payment by the county for the extra work (whether plaintiff could have
recovered in quasi contract from the county was not discussed) ; that defendant's contract with plaintiff obligated defendant to pay only for extra work
which the engineer should properly require and for which defendant was
entitled to compensation; but that the whole amount paid to defendant for
extra work should "in common justice" be paid over to plaintiff. Seastrand
v. Foley Co., 135 Minn. 5.
After the decision of the foregoing case, the legislature empowered,
though it did not require, the county to pay for the extra work, and the
county paid to defendant the sum of $4,307. Plaintiff brought another action,
claiming only enough to make up the contract price for the extra work.
Held, that the suit was not barred by the former adjudication because it
was based on facts which transpired since the former decision; and that
plaintiff was entitled to recover on principles of quasi contract. Seastrand
v. Foley Co. (Minn., 1919), 175 N. W. 117.
These cases, as the court intimated, present a novel problem. In so far
as they involve rendition of services in performance of the supposed requirements of a contract, the ground is familiar. Nor is there anything novel in
the failure of the defense to make the point that plaintiff must rely on
ignorance of law (if he had acted with knowledge of the law there would
be but little equity in his case), for the monstrous dogma that everyone is
presumed to know the law is fortunately not applied with logical thoroughness. Wherever there is something to mask the fact that the case is bottomed on mistake or ignorance of law, the objection is usually overlooked
both by court and counsel. See WOODWARD, QUASI CONTRACTS, 94, 134. The
point which appears to have been chiefly urged by the defense, and which
turns on the features of the case which are really novel, is this: Since the
plaintiff's services were not directly beneficial to defendant, and since they gave
defendant no legal right to compensation, it cannot be said in a strict sense
that defendant has received anything from plaintiff. This position finds some
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support in several cases where, as between rival claimants of an obligation
of a third person, the one not entitled having received payment, the rightful
claimant was denied recovery from the other. Seargeant v. Stryker, 16 N. J.
v. Kay, ioi
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duty to stop was based, first, on the ease with which an automobile could
be stopped at a railway crossing without danger of being frightened if a
train should pass near to it, and secondly, on the dangerous qualities of an
automobile, since, due to its weight and size, it might wreck a train and
injure the passengers. However, many courts, like the one in the principal
,case, have refused to hold that failure to stop is, of itself, contributory negligence as a matter of law. They have refused to follow the reasoning of the
other courts that a different rule should be applied to automobiles than to
other vehicles, and insist that ordinary rules of negligence should apply.
Walters v. Ry. Co., 47 Mont. Soi; Hartman v. Ry. (o., 132 Ia. 584; Lockridge
v. Ry. Co., I6I Ia. 74; Pendroy v. Ry. Co., i7 N. D. 433; Ry. Co. v. Dove,
184 Ind. 447; Nichols v. G. T. Ry. Co., 203 Mich. 372; L. & N. Ry. Co. v.
Treavor's Adm., 179 Ky. 337; Kent v. Ry. Co. (Wash.), 183 Pac. 87; Ry.
Co. v. Hilgartner (Texas), x49 S. W. IOp9; Ry. Co. v. Schneider, 257 Fed.
675. To put it in the words of the Indiana court, Ry. Co. v. Dove, supra,
"the fact that one is driving an automobile may have an influence on the
question of contributory negligence, just as the number and qualities of
horses and the kind of vehicle one is driving may have; but the standard of
care to be used, which is necessary to absolve from contributory negligence,
is the same, whether the traveler is on foot, on horseback, in a wagon, carriage, or any other vehicle. It is that degree of care which one of ordinary
Thus these latter
prudence would use in the particular circumstances."
authorities hold that the question of contributory negligence is for the jury,
except in cases exceptionally free from doubt. Walter v. Ry. Co., supra;
Lockridge v. Ry. Co., supra; Pendroy v. Ry. Co., supra. There seems to be
no valid reason why this absolute duty to stop should be placed on automobile drivers, in the absence .of statute, the disregarding of which makes them
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. It is a well-known
fact that prudent men often do not stop before driving across railway tracks,
and whether a person should or should not have stopped, along with looking
and listening, should be left to the jury to judge, according to the usual duty
in negligence cases, namely, what an ordinarily prudent person would have
done under the same or similar circumstances.
STATUTORY
INDEFINIT

CONSTRUCTION-STATUTE

XNSS.-A

AS To AUTOMOB=E LIGHTS VOID

VOR

Texas statute, Acts 36th Leg. (I919), c. 161, made it

unlawful to operate automobiles, motorcycles or bicycles upon public highways of the state at night time whose front lamps threw forward a light of
such glare and brilliancy as to seriously interfere with the sight of drivers
of vehicles approaching from an opposite direction. Defendant was indicted
under this statute, and he assailed its validity as creating a criminal offense.
Held, void for indefiniteness; the glare and brilliancy not being properly
defined. Griffin v. State (Tex., 192o), 218 S. W. 494.
There is no doubt that the law requires a certain degree of definiteness
in denouncing acts as criminal. LEwIS' SUTHERLAND'S STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIoN, Vol. I, p. 86. It seems that the reason for the requirement of definite-
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ness is that there must be some certain standard by which a person can determine in advance whether or not he is complying with the statute. Cook v.
State, 26 Ind. App. 278. See also U. S. v. Capital Traction Co., 34 App. D.
C. 592, i Ann. Cas. 68. The definiteness required varies with the act prohibited and with the circumstances. State v. Schaeffer, 96 Oh. St. 215. There
crimwould seem also to be a distinction in whether the statute was civil or
inal, for it would be manifestly unfair, especially in regard to criminal offenses,
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ing the lower court, substantial damages were recoverable. Two justices
dissented. Nickerson v. Hodges (La., 1920), 84 So. 37.
The Civil Code of Louisiana provides (MiumcK's Rzv. C. C. [2d ed.],
Art. 2315), "Every act whatever of man that causes damage to another

obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it," etc. Though not
expressly referred to by the court, the decision undoubtedly is based on this
provision, the substance of which is taken from CODE NAPOLEON, 1382. The
note commenting upon Tanvier v. Sweeney, [1919] 2 K. B. 3x6, in 18 MICH.
L. RMv. 33, discusses a somewhat closely related problem in the common law.
Whether there was independently a cause of action upon which an award of
damages for mental suffering might be based, and whether the mental shock
resulted in physical derangement, questions on which such cases seem to
turn in common law jurisdictions, do not bother a court proceeding under
provisions such as are found in the CODE NAPOLEON and the Louisiana Code.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER-AGREEMENT FOR PAYMENT IN LIBERTY BONDS.-

Plaintiff agreed to convey to defendants a certain piece of property upon
payment of $42,5oo, payable one-half in cash and one-half in Liberty Bonds.
The difference between the par value and the market value of these bonds
(which had fallen below par) on the day of payment was more than $5oo.
Defendants paid $21,250 par value of bonds; and plaintiff seeks to recover this
alleged balance of $5oo due on the contract. Held, buyer was required merely
to deliver Liberty Bonds of face value of such amount, and not of the market
value thereof. Nelson v. Rhem (N. Car., 192o), IO2 S. R. 395.
In vi6w of the large number of contracts involving payment in Liberty
Bonds that are being entered into, and that will undoubtedly continue to be
negotiated as long as these bonds remain in general circulation, this case is
peculiarly interesting to the profession as well as to the man of business.
This decision appears to be the only sound one that could be reached in such
a case,-the parties have agreed upon payment in this particular medium
(depreciated paper, which can be counted by dollars), and they must abide
by their contract, whether the value of this designated medium fluctuates one
way or the other. It was agreed that 21,25o Liberty Bond dollars should be
the payment, and the vendor must accept them in full payment, even though
they have fallen below par. Kenney v. Efflnger, 115 U. S. 577. Upon default
by vendee to tender these bonds, the vendor would only have been entitled to
that sum in legal tender which would be equal to the market value, and not
the nominal value, of these $21,250 of Liberty Bonds. Robinson v. Noble, 8
Peters 181; Thompson v. Riggs, 5 Wall. 663; Myers v. Kaufman, 37 Ga. 6oo;
Williamson v. McGinnis, Ii B. Mon. (Ky.), 74.
WATERS-DIvIsioN or AccagRXoN B]3ETrEN RIPARIAN OwNFRs.--The
plaintiff and defendant are owners of ocean shore lots conveyed with reference to a survey and plat. A street separates the two lots. The suit is to
quiet title to a strip of land formed by accretion along their front. Held,
that the locus in quo is properly divisible by extending the boundary lines
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of the respective lots to the high water line. Nirdlinger v. Stevens (D. C.,
N. J., 1919), 262 Fed. 591.
The courts are agreed that no absolute rule can be laid down for the
division of lands formed by accretion and that each case must depend upon
its own circumstances. Pittsburg & L. A. Iron Co. v. Lake Sup. Iron Co.,
18 Mich. iog; Gordon v. Rice, 153 Mo. 676. The principles governing the
division of accretions are applicable to cases concerning the division of water
fronts, 'tide flats, coves, and the dry beds of inland lakes, and several of the
. cases cited below involve such situations. The following cases illustrate
rules which courts have applied in order to effect an equitable division of
such iand. The boundary lines of the upland do not determine the side lines
of the new land. Curtis v. Francis, 9 Cush. 427; Kehr v. Snyder, 114 Ill. 313.
But they may be followed if by so doing each owner will retain a proportional share of the water front and accretion. Gorton v. Rice, supra. It is
frequently said that each owner's share of the new frontaage shall be proportional to the frontage on the old shore lines, and the boundary drawn
accordingly. Deerfield v. Arms, I7 Pick. 41; Bachelder v. Keniston, 51 N. H.
496; Berry v. Hoogendoorn, 133 Ia. 437; Malone v. Mobbs, 1O2 Ark. 542,
Other courts have held that the boundary line shall be at right angles to the
water line, or, if on a river, to a line following the current in the main channel. Miller v. Hepburn, 8 Bush. 326; Wood v. Appal, 63 Pa. 21o; Clark v.
Campau, 19 Mich. 325; Reichert v. Ellis Co., 211 S. W. 4o3; Thornton v.
Grant, Io L I. 477. In other cases the dividing line is drawn at right angles
to a base line (which may be straight or in conformity to the shore) drawn
across the mouth of the cove or bay), or, in other cases, across the corners
of the lots to which the accretion has formed. Rust v. Boston Mill Corpi,
6 Pick. 158; Northern Pine Land Co. v. Bigelow & Co., 84 Wis. 157; Binerson v. Taylor, 9 Me. 42. In still other cases where the land involved is the
bed of an inland lake the division is made by drawing the boundary line at
right angles to a.line drawn through the center of the lake on its longest
diameter. Calkins v. Hart, 113 N. E. 785. None of these rules is inflexible
and variations of them have been resorted to where they would result in an
inequitable division. Stuart v. Greanyea, 154 Mich. 132; Emerson v. Taylor,
supra. In the principal case no attempt is made to formulate a general rule,
but the division is made in such a manner as to give each owner a share of
the new land in proportion to his share of the upland and a corresponding
frontage on the ocean. In addition, the decree protects from confusion many
titles to property near the locus in quo which were acquired with reference
to the street system. See notes in 21 L. R. A. 776; 25 L. R. A. (N. S.), 257;
Ann Cas. 1914 A 479.
WILLS--CONSTRUCTION-INTENT or TiSTATOR-RiGHT Or CHILDREN Or
t.-Testator directed that the residue of his estate, both
LtGAT
real and personal, should be divided into three equal shares, two of which
should be given to two of his brothers and the remaining share to the child
of a deceased brother, and appointed the legatees as executors. Held, that
DtCgAsrD
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where testator, by codicil, after the death of one brother appointed a son of
such brother executor in place of his father, such child would take. Dent et
al. v. Dent et al. (S. C., 1920), l02 S. E. 715.
As a general rule, the law favors the construction of a devise which will
prevent its lapsing. Kamps Ex. v. Hollenberg, 8 Ky. L. Rep. 529; the intent
of the testator will ordinarily prevail in the construction and disposition of
a devise. Brattle Square Church v. Grant, 3 Gray (Mass.) I42, 63 Am. Dec.
725. This intent is to be sought for in a consideration of the entire instrument in view of all the attendant circumstances. German v. Gerinan, 27 Pa.
St. 116, 67 Am. Dec. 451. At the common law, on the death of a devisee
or legatee, his share of the estate would lapse and be disposed of under the
rules of intestacy. 2 RnIrmu ON \WViL, 157. This was true, though the
bequest read to his brother, his heirs and assigns where the legatee left several children. Thwrnley v. Kershaw, iog Ill. App. 113; or where the apparent
result of the intestacy would be to increase the portion of one already provided for. Magnuso' v. Magnuson, 197 Ill. 496; or where the intent to include
the children of legatees might be fairly presumed, but no provision had been
made for such an exigency as the death of a devisee. Cureton v. Massey, 13
Rich. (S. C.) 1o4. If, however, the devise was to a class jointly, the death
of one would result in survivorship. Jackson v. Roberts, 14 Gray (Mass.)
546; or if the legacy was given to discharge an obligation of the testator it
will go as directed. A large number of states, of which the following are
examples, have by statute done away with this lapsing where the devise is
to direct offspring. Moore v. Hayden, 82 Me. 227; RV. ST'., c. 74, Sec. io;
Cheney v. Sehan, 71 Ga. 384; CODM, Sec. 2462; Harris v. Harris, 12 Gill &
J. (Md.) 474, Act of i8io, c. 34. Some have extended it to cover bequests
to other lineal descendants, but not to collateral relatives. Gordon v. Pendleton, 84 N. C. 98, Rtv. COnE, N. C., c. 119, Sec. 28; Jones v. Jones, 37 Ala.
646, CODE or ALA3AWA, Sec. 16o5; Bishop v. Bishop, 4 Hill (N. Y.) 138, 2
RAV. ST., p. 66; Maxwell v. Featherstone, 83 Ind. 339, 2 Rrv. ST. (1876), p.
573, Rrv. ST. (188I), Sec. 2571. Even where the devise is to a class as tenants in common it seems the devise lapses. Davis "Heirsv. Taid, 36 Ky. 51;
Huston v. Read, 32 N. J. Eq. 591. In In re Bari's Estate, 2 Pa. 428, testator
devised all his estate to his seven brothers and sisters, naming them, "or
their survivors." At the time of making his will four of them were dead,
leaving issue alive at the time, and this fact was known to him. It was there
held that the word "survivors" meant representatives, since this, the court
found, would more nearly approximate testator's intention, and it was obvious that the will had been drawn by an illiterate man. The majority in the
instant case contend the codicil, in view of the whole scheme of the will,
indicated testator's intent to substitute the son. Since there is no statement
or direct implication that he shall be so substituted, the case is to that extent
an extension of the general rule.
WILL,-REvocATIoN By DiRECTION TO ATTORNEY To DsTRoy.-A letter was
written by testatrix to her attorney, who had custody of her will, directing
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him to destroy it. This note to him was signed by two witnesses in the'
manner required by statute for revocation of a will by other writing. Her
attorney, confined in a hospital at the time and until after her death, made
no effort to carry out the directions, although he was informed as to the
contents of the letter. DCD1Nt ESTAz LAWv, Sec. 34; LAWS OVi909, c. 18;
CONSoL. LAWS, c. 13, provides a will may be revoked by other writing of
testator "declaring such revocation," and executed with the same formalities
with which the will itself was required to be executed; or may be revoked
by burning, tearing, cancelling, obliterating, or destroying, with intent and
for the purpose of revoking same, "by the testator himself, or by another
person in his presence, by his direction and consent." Held, not a revocation ipso facto within the statute, but a mere authority to her attorney to
destroy. In re McGiil's Will, 181 N. Y. S. 48.
At first sight this decision, under the New York statute, seems to be correct, inasmuch as testatrix did not declare "such revocation" on the face of
this letter, duly executed in accordance with the requirements of the statute.
But in order to reach this result one must proceed upon the theory that testatrix intended a revocation by destruction of the will in the future, and not a
present revocation by the execution of this writing in accordance with the
requirements of the statute. The testatrix, presumed to know the law, could
not have intended a subsequent revocation by destruction, because this would
have been impossible, unless done "by testator himself, or by another person
in his presence, by his direction and consent" She could not have contemplated this event, because she knew at the time that her attorney was confined in the hospital. Inasmuch as there is only one alternative left under
the statute, it seems that testatrix must have intended prescnt revocation by
this writing duly executed according to the requirements of the statute. This
view is supported by the fact that she had two witnesses, as required by the
statute for revocation, and as would not have been necessary to merely confer authority on the attorney to revoke. Then, too, it is only natural that
she should want to have her revoked will destroyed so as to prevent any
inconvenience or contest arising thereafter. This explains her reason for
directing the destruction of the will, not to complete the revocation, but
merely to put the already revoked will out of the way. Thus it seems that
the court (by a three to two decision) relied rather upon the wording of the
statute than upon its purpose, and defeated the testatrix's present intention
to revoke, which had been put into writing as required by the statute for
revocation. It is to be hoped that the Court of Appeals will rectify this error
of the Supreme Court of New York, and will render their decision in accordance with the view that such directions show a present intent absolutely to
revoke, and amount to a revocation ipso facto. The English cases support
this view, and no other cases directly in point have been cited for the contrary view. Walcott v. Ochterlony, i Curt. 580; Matter of Goods of Durance,
L. R. 2 P. & D. 4o6; Malharafah PertabNarain Singh v. Maharanee Subbhao
Kooer, L. K. 4 Ind. App. 228; Matters of Eyre, 2 Ir. R. [I9o5], 54o. It is true
that the English statute as to revocation (i Vxcr. 26, Sec. 2o) may be dis-
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tinguished in wording from the above New York statute,-stating a will
may be revoked by an instrument "declaring an intention to revoke, "-but it
seems that this is really a distinction without a difference. The real and
substantial requirement is that there be a present intention to revoke, manifested in such manner as is required by the statute on revocation,-and it
seems that here we have such a case under either the English or the New
York statute.

